#1580: iPhone 13 and iPhone 13 Pro, Apple Watch Series 7, redesigned iPad mini, and upgraded iPad, plus iOS 15, iPadOS 15, watchOS 8, and tvOS 15When certain applications want to access the keychain, I am getting asked for. Probably you are just prompted to do that at startup after Mac admin password reset, such as on Yosemite, or constantly asked to enter the keychain password after. Since the keychain is still protected with the old administrator password, there would be no way to get back into it unless you could update keychain password or create new keychain.#1579: Apple “California Streaming” event, OS security updates, Epic Games v. - Click General, then click Reset My Default Keychain. - From the Keychain Access menu, choose Preferences.Select the Lock after checkbox, then enter a number of minutes. Choose Edit > Change Settings for Keychain login. In the Keychain Access app on your Mac, click login in the Keychains list. It might also tell you that the system was unable to unlock your login keychain.If your Mac keeps asking for your keychain password.#1576: Work with image text using TextSniper and Photos Search, upgrade your home Wi-Fi, comparing MagSafe battery packsWhy Apple Asks for Your Passcode or Password with a New Login (and Why It’s Safe)If you’ve set up or restored an Apple device recently and have two-factor authentication enabled on your Apple ID, you may have seen a message during configuration that defies your understanding of how Apple maintains device privacy and account security.The message reads something like, “Enter Mac Password. #1577: iPhone 12/12 Pro repair program, fix corrupted Chrome extensions, iCloud Mail custom domains, Chipolo AirTag alternative, 10-digit dialing changes #1578: Apple delays CSAM detection, upgrade Quicken 2007 to Quicken Deluxe, App Store settlement and regulatory changes
Get My To Stop Ag For Keychain ? Plus IOS 15Now I’ve figured out what is going on by reviewing Apple’s documentation and deducing the missing pieces. (It has a new, shorter title in this release, and is already updated for iOS 13.1—check it out if you’re looking for more information about iOS networking, privacy, and security.)While I had heard of this prompt happening once last year, I had never seen it myself. I had to take a photo of this unusual login screen, as it was during setup and screen capture wasn’t available.Doesn’t this seem contradictory, confusing, and just plain wrong? Why would Apple ask for the password or passcode for one of your other devices? Could it be some sort of scam? What exactly is going on here?I encountered this issue, as did Take Control publisher Joe Kissell, in preparing the iOS 13 and iPadOS 13 revision to my long-running networking and security book, Connect and Secure Your iPhone and iPad. Your password is encrypted and cannot be read by Apple.” The prompt might instead ask for your iPhone or iPad passcode. This password protects your Apple ID, saved passwords, and other data stored in iCloud. Watermark pdf for macFor that subset, Apple maintains the encryption keys that protect the data when it’s at rest, and it could turn over that data if forced to by law enforcement.Apple discloses which data is stored with encryption keys it possesses. Some of it is available in decrypted form if you were to access it via iCloud.com. ICloud Stores Two Kinds of Secured Data for YouAll the data that’s synced between your devices via iCloud is encrypted while in transit (generally using HTTPS) and at rest on Apple’s servers. But it’s not sufficiently detailed—that would require screens of text—to explain what’s going on. Since then, certificate-issuing and -tracking procedures and the way browsers check for legitimately issued documents have substantially reduced but not eliminated that particular risk.Because of phishing risks, Apple has chosen to protect some data that it views as highly secure or very private with end-to-end encryption that prevents Apple from knowing anything about the contents of the synced data. Some visitors to Google sites were phished in this way on multiple occasions several years ago. There are many kinds of phishing attacks, one severe type of which involves obtaining fraudulently issued HTTPS certificates that can have all the trappings of a legitimate and secure site.The attacker could then simply use your login name and password to initiate an attempt to log in to iCloud, even triggering Apple to send you an extra login token used for two-factor authentication, which, if you entered it on the phishing site, could be used by the attacker at iCloud.Apple users have been phished, of course, although as far as I know, Apple has never suffered from a fraudulent certificate attack. Phishing requires only that an attacker fools someone into thinking they are entering their credentials into a legitimate site that is, instead, a man-in-the-middle. It’s extremely unlikely, but it’s not strictly impossible.This data could also be at risk in a successful phishing attack. (This approach is distinct from the way Apple stores even more sensitive data—credit-card numbers, passcodes, and fingerprint or face parameters—in the Secure Enclave of iPhones, iPads, and Macs with T2 chips. If Apple were asked to disclose this information by a government, it could only produce unreadable encrypted data, by design. In essence, iCloud acts as a sync service with zero knowledge about what it’s transmitting. There are also likely other bits of data that facilitate device-to-device interactions.As a result, you cannot view these categories of data at iCloud.com, only using your devices. Instead, those keys reside only on individual iPhones, iPads, and Macs.There’s a full list of end-to-end encrypted services at Apple’s iCloud security overview page they include iCloud Keychain, Screen Time information, Health data, Wi-Fi passwords, the People album in Photos, and the new Find My service’s crowdsourced location information. The Mac encrypts the login entry with the public key of the iPhone, which receives it via iCloud sync, and then decrypts it with its private key. Let’s say your iPhone is missing a Web site login you just created on your Mac. Devices in the user’s sync set, including newly enrolled hardware, sync by exchanging metadata information. The devices never reveal their private keys and have the public keys of all the other devices connected to an iCloud account.The data protected in this way is stored as individual packages—for example, a URL, account name, and password as a single unit—and identified with random metadata that’s meaningless except to establish a unique ID for each data package. For iCloud Keychain and similar sensitive data, Apple has your devices generate and maintain a set of public and private keys that enable interaction with the information synced across iCloud. The public key can be shared freely and used by anyone who wants to encrypt material meant for the owner of the private key, who can then decrypt that data. ![]() I recall using one years ago, and TidBITS publisher Adam Engst had never heard the term before editing this article.)But there’s a flaw in both the iCloud password and the iCloud Security Code approaches, and I wonder if that’s why Apple is now asking for passwords or passcodes from other devices in your sync set. In this case, it’s something you create or Apple creates for you on one device and that you enter on another.(Never heard of an iCloud Security Code? You’re not alone! It’s barely mentioned on Apple’s site, and Apple’s white paper doesn’t discuss the code deeply. Out-of-band elements are a common way to block data hijacking by requiring a secret that has never been put online. (This is also used for a lot of data stored in a Secure Enclave, like your passcode.)You could enable an iCloud Security Code as an “out-of-band” element—something that is never transmitted by the same means as other data. While Apple doesn’t know your iCloud password, whenever you log in at iCloud. It may not be robust enough to match Apple’s current security and authentication requirements.As for the iCloud password, it suffers from a different set of concerns. It was also created when iCloud Keychain was the only set of data Apple secured end-to-end and synced via iCloud, and before both two-step verification and the later two-factor authentication for Apple ID.
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